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U.S. No. 115134
Copy No. 2 of 8

17 JUN 1955

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : National ELINT Organization and Recommendations of the
Killian and Clark Reports

1. In accordance with the request of the DDCI, I have reviewed subject reports from the standpoint of their relevance to present negotiations leading to the establishment of a system for management of ELINT at the national level.

2. The Killian report recognizes the importance of the subject and says under Part 5, Intelligence, Recommendations:

"8. There are generally recognized technical and administrative problems in the field of ELINT (electronic noise listening). This situation needs attention. A combination of technical knowledge and adequate authority is wanted."

This recommendation, as you know, was backed by considerable study by the intelligence task force, but which is not detailed in the text of the main report of the Technological Capabilities Panel.

3. The Clark Committee considers ELINT under two task force reports:

Appendix 1, Part 1, Report of the Survey of the National Security Agency, Section 7 - Electronic Intelligence, and;
Appendix 1, Part 2, Report of Survey of Communications and Electronics, Section 7 - Electronics Intelligence (ELINT).

4. In summary, the recommendations of the first report say that ELINT is important, it is closely related to COMINT, it is at present badly organized and uncoordinated, and that a plan has been prepared by the Office of Special Operations, Department of Defense:

"to coordinate ELINT analysis activities under a single direction to guide and coordinate the collection of all ELINT information and to provide for optimum interaction and mutual support between ELINT and COMINT."

It is stated that this plan makes the Secretary of one of the Departments executive for SecDef and contemplates implementation through an NSCID.

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6. The report says, "there must be an operating body with Executive authority, but its composition and degree of authority have created a wide diversity of opinion." It then states that, "lack of consideration of CIA is an added objection to the specific plans proposed." It then goes on to discuss the desirability of coordinating phases of ELINT with COMINT under NSA.

7. This report then says:

"Recommendation No. 3. That ELINT and COMINT be integrated to the extent of placing ELINT under NSA for analysis of the product and guidance and coordination in the collection and dissemination of ELINT. The authority of operational commanders over their integral ELINT resources, however, should not be abridged. USCIB or the combined board which is recommended in this report to replace it should exercise only policy control over ELINT matters."

8. The second report reviews the problems of ELINT at length and in some detail discusses the "relationship of communications, communications intelligence, and electronics intelligence." One paragraph which sets the tone of this report is as follows:

"It is of high importance that the effort not be handicapped by organizational concepts which tend to separate the COMINT and ELINT operations from communicators who can help in attaining maximum results in operations, training, research and development, and especially in providing technically qualified personnel to assist in operations. Such help will be of greatest importance in time of emergency."

9. Conclusion No. 9 of the report says,

"the present plan covering the organization of the electronics intelligence operation is definitely weak from the technical operating viewpoint."

Recommendation No. 1 says,

"That an intelligence communications and electronics subcommittee (ICES) to the combined intelligence board should be established."

(This assumes that "USCIB" and "USCEB" have been combined into a single board as proposed elsewhere in this project). Recommendation No. 3 says,

"That more effective technical advice be injected into the USCIB deliberations to permit development of more appropriate statements

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of the intelligence objectives would be accomplished by communications or electronic means."

Recommendation No. 6,

"that any arrangements with respect to centralized control of ELINT give adequate consideration to the immediate and vital interest of the military in this field and the need to keep electronic countermeasures (ECM) - a tactical weapon - clearly under military operational control."

Recommendation No. 7 in summary,

"that planning and operation of communications and electronics efforts in support of intelligence activities include full consideration of:

- a. Facilities expected to be available in time of war or emergency.
- b. The placing of key intelligence installations outside of target areas, and
- c. Pending the accomplishment of b. the effective development of interim disaster plans."

7. I am advised that the summary of the Clark Report merely endorses the recommendations of these two task forces.

8. The Killian Report points up ELINT as a problem needing attention and recommends action. One task force of the Clark Report recommends assigning the ELINT problem to NSA and the other merely points it up and recommends action. However, neither set forth facts or arguments concerning the management of ELINT which have not already been considered at top levels in Defense and CIA. Although there is much of merit in the task force reports of the Clark Committee for future guidance in dealing with the ELINT problem in detail, there is nothing which, in my opinion, warrants any change in previous plans for high level organization.

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10. So far as the military services are concerned (and in certain types of CIA activities), ELINT is to a greater extent than COMINT a source of vital information generating immediate action on the part of the forces involved.

and there is need for close association of ELINT collection activities in the field with the normal field operations of CIA and the services.

11. The extensive processing now required in the use of COMINT often results in masking or disguising important detailed technical information. The present large fixed COMINT collection system operates such that collection and exploitation takes so long that the information derived therefrom is not of immediate value for tactical operations but is more in the nature of strategic intelligence.

12. Close association of ELINT collection with the operating forces in the field will provide for immediate use of tactical information by the field commander and at the same time provide that information necessary for analysis, evaluation and collation with other intelligence in a central processing center to yield electronic intelligence of major value to national intelligence. The technical information derived from ELINT will also provide the information essential to all phases of preparation of countermeasures including research, development, production, training and operational use.

13. The recommendations of Appendix 1, Part 1 of the Clark Report appear to contemplate NSA operation of a substantial portion of ELINT collection facilities (as is presently the case for COMINT) and that the establishment of all requirements should be under NSA control. It also proposes that, "the study, analysis, evaluation, interpretation and research and development of ELINT should be under central direction"; i.e., NSA. CIA would have difficulty in turning to NSA for control of many of the clandestine and other activities through which it can make a major contribution to the collection of ELINT. The system proposed under NSCID-17 and the proposed Department of Defense Directive is believed to allow considerable flexibility and at the same time provide adequate centralized control *under USCIB*

14. We would concur in the apparent recommendation for consolidation of COMINT, ELINT and communications security responsibility under a "combined intelligence board." As a matter of fact, this is exactly

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what has been accomplished by NSCID-17 insofar as ELINT is concerned and we feel the placing of responsibilities for national policy in the field of ELINT in USCIB is an important forward step.

15. NSA has a limitless job in dealing with its primary field of activity without diluting its talent with becoming concerned with the management and policy guidance of an important new field of activity.

16. In conclusion, we would like to take this whole area of activity out of litigation. We have NSCID-17 and believe it is a sound document. The Clark Committee reports and recommendations were based on circumstances as they existed some months ago. They discussed the problem with all the people who have been involved in the Defense-CIA talks and they propound no arguments which have not been fully considered during our negotiations. What is needed is a dynamic approach to the problem recognizing that changes in policy and organization may be required in the future as our experience with this subject develops. We feel we have a sound basis on which to proceed and would like to get on with the job.

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